My Mind’s Musings

This past week I finished reading, The Generals’ War, by Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor (USMC Ret.) . It is a fascinating account of the Gulf War from a strategic to an operational level perspective. The authors were given nearly unlimited access to the key players, and did an amazing amount of research to produce what is really the premier text on the 1991 Gulf War. I had to read this book for the course “Operational level of war” in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Distance Ed Program, but although I started reading it academically, it really was enjoyable and interesting. If you are looking for gory battle details and other shoot ‘em up details, this is not the book you want. Its goal is to show the relationships between the armed services and the political structures that control our military and how we fought one particular war. I have read General Schwarzkopf’s biography, and seen his views on the Gulf War, and comparing the differing views is fascinating. General Schwarzkopf’s biography, It Doesn’t take a Hero, lays out the view of the war that is what the military wanted to be put forth and pretty much consistently has been. The Gulf War is generally seen as joint warfighting at its best, with a superbly brilliant combatant commander (Schwarzkopf), who was given complete freedom to wage the war in the best military manner by the Pentagon (General Powell) and National Command Authority (President). The Gulf War may be the best example we have of that in recent times, but the behind the scenes picture is not quite that simple.

The writers clearly show, backed up by declassified reports and many first hand interviews that many of the brilliant military moves that Schwarzkopf took credit for were in fact not his and some he even opposed at first. For example, the famous left hook by the Army that is generally credited with bringing the ground war to a close in 4 days was not his idea and he was not excited about it the first time he heard it. The staged amphibious landing that the Marines did in order to keep the Iraqis defensively engaged in eastern Kuwait was opposed by General Schwarzkopf, but General Walt Boomer insisted on it happening. This was later credited to Schwarzkopf’s overall strategy. The Generals’ War does not try to beat up General Schwarzkopf in any way, but the book does show where the ideas came from that were later claimed by he and others to be his own. General Schwarzkopf was without a doubt a brilliant commander, but he owed some of that brilliance to other’s ideas.

One area that the book views as a negative that is Schwarzkopf’s leadership style with regards to how he brought together the various services. In truly joint warfare, Schwarzkopf as the combatant commander is in command of every service in his area of responsibility. General Schwarzkopf basically gave the southern Kuwait area to the Marines, the western Kuwait and Iraq area to the Army and the Air War to the Air Force and let each come up with their own war plans. Even when the war plans of each service didn’t quite sync up, he tended to be hesitant to get involved and make sure that the war plans would ensure completion of his overall mission. The authors demonstrate this in a couple of different ways. This really showed up when the Air Force was so focused on bombing in Iraq to the neglect of bombing missions in support of the upcoming ground war, Schwarzkopf did not step in to force the Air Force generals to provide better support to the Army and Marine Corps. Another way this played out, was that the Marine Corps warfighting strategy was to go fast and furious to Kuwait City, whereas the Army was very methodical in positioning troops and equipment in order to perform the left hook into Iraq and take out the Republican Guard. The Marines attack, instead of being the envisioned holding action, basically routed the Iraqi Army and caused many of the Republican Guard units to escape to the safety of interior Iraq without being destroyed. This left the best Iraqi units with the ability to still wage war and put down the eventual Shiite and Kurdish insurgencies.

The authors also show the politics that took place behind the scenes in Washington trying and in some cases succeeding in controlling the war plans. While the public face was that Washington was staying out of Schwarzkopf’s way, it is clearly seen that that is not totally true. The air war strategy and part of the ground war strategy actually came out of the bowels of the Pentagon, and the initial pitch to Schwarzkopf and the other services combatant commanders did not make them very happy. There were other issues where Generals at the Pentagon did not think that Schwarzkopf was the right man for the job, the Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time (and a personal hero of mine) General Al Gray, apparently at first did not think that General Boomer was the right man to lead the Marines into Kuwait, and there were other personnel questions and issues.

One of the services that took real hits in the book is the Air Force. The authors clearly show that the Air Force really thought that they could win a war from the air, and never thought a ground war was necessary. Their strategy was shown to be impossible. Air Power is a huge advantage that the United States has, but to think that air power on its own would win a war is unrealistic. They never were fully integrated into the overall joint mindset because they never thought the ground war would happen.

The Generals’ War at its core raises the question, “Did the United States win actually accomplish its mission?” The public answer that has always been given is, yes, based on the fact that Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. However, it was clear based on reports from the time that there was a general belief that if this war was undertaken correctly Saddam Hussein would be out of power in Iraq. That did not happen. At the very least, CENTCOM had as one of its central missions as stated by Schwarzkopf to destroy the Republican Guard. The intelligence reports afterwards clearly showed that that did not happen as thoroughly as intended. The authors do not intend to directly answer that question, but instead to ask the questions and give the evidence that may show all of the mission was not accomplished, and there are still many real issues to be faced in truly joint warfare.

Overall, The Generals’ War was a fascinating read, that will give you a better understanding of the Operational and to a lesser degree, Strategic level of war. While Schwarzkopf and Powell do lose some of their luster from the pages of the book, they are still recognized as being leaders of amazing ability. The most important contribution of this book, other than its study of an important military operation, is its value for training future leaders in joint warfare. Hopefully, we have learned these lessons and can truly begin to function as a joint force in an asymmetrical and chaotic battlefield that we face today.